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COMMENTS

Trade Friction, Administrative Guidance and
Antimonopoly Law in Japan
by Kozo Toyama,
Norifumi Tateishi
and John Palenberg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Japan has come under heavy pressure in recent years from its Euro-

pean and North American trade partners to take steps to reduce international trade friction. Favorite targets of critics abroad have been the
cooperative relationships which bind Japanese industry and government
into what appears to be a solid economic unit: "Japan, Inc."1 Of particular concern and alarm has been the use of "administrative guidance" (gy-useishidli) by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) to regulate the Japanese economy.2 Usually issued in the form of
* Messrs. Toyama (B. Jur., University of Tokyo, 1963, M.C.L., University of Illinois,
1973) and Tateishi (B. Jur., University of Tokyo, 1977) are attorneys and Mr. Palenberg
(J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982, M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, 1982,
Admitted to N.Y. Bar, 1983) is an assistant in the Tokyo law office of Konaka, Toyama &
Hosoya.
I See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG.,
IST SESS., REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 10-17, 83-84 (Comm. Print 1981) (criticiz-

ing the role of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry in insulating Japanese
industry from foreign competition, particularly through the use of cartels) [hereinafter cited
as TRADE REPORT]; Japan Times, Apr. 12, 1983, at A6, col. 3; Japan Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at
All, col. 1.
2 "Administrative guidance" consists of non-compulsory advice offered by government
ministries to the parties which they oversee. See Sanekata, Administrative Guidance and
the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAW INJAPAN: AN ANNUAL 65, 68 (1977); Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the Rule of Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 22 (1974). A thorough
treatment of the nature and theoretical underpinnings of administrative guidance may be
found in Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 45 (1968). See also
infra notes 11 and 14.
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"non-compulsory" but nonetheless highly persuasive suggestions or veiled
threats, administrative guidance is regularly used by MITI to orchestrate
the unification of prices, the limitation of production, and, in some cases,
outright cartelization.3 Recently, the Tokyo High Court 4 issued two prominent decisions which focus on the conflict between MITI's market
orchestration and the free market principles enshrined in the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law.'
This article will focus on these two decisions, popularly known as the
Oil Cartel Cases, and their relationship to international trade issues. The
article first describes cultural conditions which form the broad context in
which the Oil Cartel Cases arose before examining the substance and the
impact of the two decisions. The attitudes which another Japanese court,
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), and MITI have adopted
toward the controversy are also considered. Finally, the article argues
that the time has come for MITI to curtail its pervasive administrative
guidance activity.
II. TRADrrIONAL ATTITUDES
Under the Emperor Meiji's reign (1866-1912), Japan transformed itself from a backward feudal society into a modern industrial state.' The
startling transformation was planned, initiated and controlled from
above-a scheme designed by statesmen determined to put Japan on an
I TRADE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-17, 83-84.
The Tokyo High Court is the court of first instance in Japanese antimonopoly litigation. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu (Law
Relating to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade),
Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 85, translated in 2 EMuN-HoRaI SHA LAW BuLLgirN SERmS KA
[hereinafter cited as Antimonopoly Law]. See generally H. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM 48-54 (1976).
' Judgment of Sept. 26, 1980, T'kyU K~t5 Saibansho, Tokyo, 33 Ko-t5saibansho Keiji V
359 (Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi krsei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu ihan jiken)
(Case Concerning the Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of
Preserving Fair Trade) [hereinafter cited as Oil Production Control Cartel Case]; Judgment
of Sept. 26, 1980, T'kyo Kot Saibansho, Tokyo, 33 K'dtusaibansho Keiji V 511, 528-27
(Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu ihan jiken)
(Case Concerning the Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of
Preserving Fair Trade) [hereinafter cited as the Oil Price Control Cartel Case]. The conflict,
pitting MITI against the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Japan's antimonopoly champion, has flared sporadically over the past thirty years. See Matsushita, The Antimonopoly
Law of Japan, 11 LAW INJAPAN: AN ANNUAL 57, 57-58 (1978); Note, Trustbusting in Japan:
Cartels and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1064, 1065-73 (1981). Recent skirmishes between MITI and the JFTC are described in Saida, Industry Seeks Easing
of Antimonopoly Policy; Consumers Speak Out Against Big Business, INDusTRIAL RavIEw
OF JAPAN 28 (1983).
6 E. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 118-27 (3d ed. 1981).
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equal (if not superior) footing with the powerful nations of Europe and
America.7 The government created capital-intensive enterprises carried
them through their unprofitable early years and then, after selling them
to favored private concerns, carefully provided for their continued wellbeing.8 Laissez-faire and free market economic theories were studied and
debated among intellectuals, but never gained enough support to loosen
the tight bond between Japanese government and industry.9 Only after
World War II, when the framers of post-war Japan were seeking to "democratize" Japan's monopoly- and cartel-ridden society, did antitrust
theory become an animating force in Japanese business organization and
law. Modeled upon the U.S. antitrust laws, the "Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade" (the
Antimonopoly Law) was super-imposed upon an economic culture quite
alien to those in which antitrust theory had developed.10
Today, Japan's leaders recognize that a degree of competition is essential to the efficient operation of the market, but they have not abandoned their dedication to the maintenance of orderly and controlled production, pricing, and marketing through direct government intervention
in, and coordination of, private industry.' The distrust of government
which often characterizes business opinion in the United States is generally lacking in Japanese industry. Advice or instructions issued formally
or informally by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), Ministry of Finance, and other government agencies are regularly
assumed to be in accordance with law, entitled to respect, and in the
long-term best interests of both the particular industry and society at
large.1 2 Cooperation and social harmony are often considered desirable
7 Id. at 109-37; &. SToRRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 102-04 (1960).
8 E. REiSCHAUER, supra note 6, at 122-31, 159-63; R. STORRY, supra note 7, at 121-24.
9 See W. BEASLEY, TaE MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN 216-17, 226-27 (3d ed. 1981);
Kaneko, A Survey of Philosophy in Japan1870-1929, in WESTERN INFLUENCES IN MODERN

58-60 (I. Nitobe ed. 1931).
supra note 5, at 1066.
1,See generally id. at 1068-73. A discussion of the intensive government intervention
at the time of the oil crisis is provided in Smith, Prices and Petroleum in Japan: 19731974-A Study of Administrative Guidance, 10 LAw IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 81, 91-97 (1977).
For an exposition of the Japanese government's heavy reliance upon cartels to promote Jap-

JAPAN

10Note,

anese exports, see Matsushita, Export Control and Export Cartelsin Japan,20 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 103, 113-116 (1979). See also Japan Times, Feb. 15, 1983, at A12, col 3 (governmentbusiness cooperation perhaps central to Japanese economic process).
12 We base this observation primarily upon our day-to-day dealings in contemporary
Japanese business society. The basic attitude is ancient. Prince Shotoku, the seventh-century A.D. saint-founder of the Japanese state, stated the principle in the first article of the

Code of State Ethics:
Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honoured.

All persons are influenced by class-feelings, and there are few who are intelligent.
Hence there are some who disobey their lords and fathers or who maintain feuds
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ends in themselves, and not just means to other ends. 3 As a result, there4
exists a systemic bias in favor of pervasive administrative guidance.1
Against this backdrop, the Tokyo High Court's oil cartel decisions imposed the first judicially crafted restraints upon the interventionist tendencies of the bureaucracies.
III.
A.

RECENT CASES

Oil Production Control Cartel Case (September 26, 1980)

Just prior to the oil crisis of 1973-1974, Japan's Petroleum Federation (Sekiyu renmei)' 5 organized a cartel for the control of the production
of oil in Japan. The Tokyo Public Prosecutor's Office indicted the Petroleum Federation and its officers for criminal violations of the Antimonopoly Law provisions prohibiting the formation of unauthorized cartels by
with the neighbouring villages. But when those above are harmonious and those
below are friendly, and there is concord in the discussion of business, right views
of things spontaneously gain acceptance. Then what is there that cannot be
accomplished?
K. SINGER, MIRROR, SWORD AND JEWEL 62 (Kodansha ed. 1981). For an analysis of the background to the Japanese public's tendency to respect the instructions and legal interpretations of officialdom, see E. KAPLAN, JAPAN, THE GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 30-32
(1972); Tanaka & Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of Law: A
Comparative Study of Japaneseand American Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 34, 37-39
(1974). Obviously, there are exceptional cases in which businessmen decline to follow administrative guidance. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 94.
" Scholarly treatments of the persistence of the collectivist ethic in Japanese society
abound. See, e.g., W. BEASLEY, supra note 9, at 256; T. Doi, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE
134-36 (3d ed. 1981); S. KATO, FORM, STYLE, TRADmON 27-32 (Kodansha ed. 1981).
14 A description of the somewhat elastic restraints on bureaucratic discretion in the use
of administrartive guidance is provided in Narita, supra note 2, at 45, 64-72. Professor
Narita points out that businesses heed administrative guidance for more than reasons of
general respect for the principles underlying harmonious social interaction:
[B]ecause administrative agencies are generally in a superior and domineering position over the people and have behind them all manner of coercive authority
based on laws and regulations, it is sometimes easy for administrative agencies to
exceed the limits of voluntary action and to engage in actual coercion. Even where
administrative agencies have no direct coercive authority over the matter at hand,
it is not hard to imagine that the general populace will sometimes comply unwillingly with administrative guidance out of ignorance of the law and out of the fear
that the agency will get even with them sooner or later. Under such circumstances,
there may be some fear that an administrative agency could, if it were so minded,
coolly and without statutory authority compel actions and thus substantially eviscerate constitutionalism by resorting to administrative guidance.
Id. at 77.
'" The Petroleum Federation is the Japanese oil industry trade association. In 1973, its
membership consisted of oil companies, 24 of which refined and distributed oil. Oil Production Control Cartel Case, 33 K'0tosaibansho Keiji V at 388.
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trade associations."' The defendants contended inter alia that, in accord
with a custom established ten years before the onset of the oil crisis, they
had submitted their annual oil supply plan to MITI, and that they had
been instructed by, or at least had cooperated with, MITI in the orderly
adjustment of Japan's oil market. They claimed that because they had
been following MITI's administrative guidance,
they could neither have
17
violated the law nor had any criminal intent.
The court found the defendants innocent of criminal violations of the
Antimonopoly Law, but only because they lacked mens rea.1s The court
determined that MITI had been actively intervening in the oil market
and that this intervention had come in the form of administrative guidance, but denied that the MITI involvement in itself absolved the defendants of culpability. 9 The court recognized that MITI officials had "approved" (shonin) the oil supply plans at issue in the case, but found that
the Petroleum Federation and its members had retained ultimate authority over how much oil the producers would actually produce for the Japanese market. 20 The court concluded that MITI's approval of the Petroleum Federation's production scheme had not been affirmative
administrative guidance, but simply passive acceptance of an independently designed, submitted, and executed plan .2 - Thus, the defendants'
actions were their own responsibility. However, since the defendants had
lacked the requisite awareness of the criminality of their actions, the
court acquitted them.
In pathbreaking dicta, the court announced that MITI's administrative guidance per se enjoys no special exemption from the Antimonopoly
Law.22 In the absence of clear statutory authority, instructions from MITI
which result in the unauthorized cartelization of producers may involve
MITI in a violation of law, regardless of whether MITI issues a detailed
plan or simply general instructions to reorder and level production. Particularly treacherous for MITI, concluded the court, are instructions to
trade associations which are almost certain to prompt condemnable carte"SId. at 375-378. The Petroleum Federation was charged with a violation of article 8 of
the Antimonopoly Law, which forbids trade associations from, inter alia, committing acts
which "substantially restrict competition in any particular field of trade." Antimonopoly
Law, supra note 4, at art. 8. The indictment of the Petroleum Federation was part of a
general crusade against cartelization led by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. See
Smith, supranote 11, at 97-99. The case was from the outset particularly important because
a judgment against the defendants would have been certain to result in the first criminal
conviction for cartelization activity which involved administrative guidance.
17 Oil Production Control Cartel Case, 33 Ktosaibansho Keiji V at 480-481.
11 See id. at 506-510.
'9 Id. at 486-491.
20
21

22

Id.
Id. at 490-491.
Id. at 481-486.
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lization.13 The court suggested that if economic conditions dictate the formation of a cartel for which there is no statutory Antimonopoly Law exemption, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission's (JFTC) approval should
first be obtained, as is explicitly required by the Anas a general matter
24
timonopoly Law.

By noting that administrative guidance may easily trigger illegal
cartelization and that MITI had been intervening intensively in the oil
industry, the court cast a shadow over MITI's practices and obliquely endorsed a line of arguments which scholarly proponents of free trade policies (and critics of MITI) had been voicing for years.2 5
B. Oil Price Control Cartel Case (September 26, 1980)
Under the same circumstances which gave rise to the oil production
cartel, twelve Japanese oil producers26 joined to form a price cartel during
1972 and 1973, and were indicted in 1974 by the Tokyo Public Prosecu27
tor's Office for price cartelization in violation of the Antimonopoly Law.
The defendants maintained their innocence on the basis that they had
joined to raise prices only in reliance upon administrative guidance from
MITI.2 8 The court rejected their argument and found them guilty as
charged.

29

Examining MITI's course of dealing with the oil producers during
the oil crisis, the court concluded that MITI had not exercised its administrative guidance to create the oil price cartel, and that MITI's review of,
and acquiescence in, the establishment of a common price line had been
no more than passive consent in the independently motivated and engineered designs of the oil producers.3 0 Accordingly, although MITI had
provided the oil producers with direct administrative guidance in pricing
in 1971, it had not used any active approval mechanisms in 1972 and
1973, so the oil producers were themselves independently responsible for
the oil crisis price cartel, and could not interpose reliance upon administrative guidance as a defense.3 For purposes of this analysis, the mere
23

Id. at 484-486.

Id. See Antimonopoly Law, supra note 4, at art. 24-3.
Oil Production Control Cartel Case, 33 Kotllsaibansho Keiji V at 484-486.
"8The twelve companies were Mitsubishi Sekiyu K.K., Zeneraru Sekiyu K.K., Idemitsu
Ko-san K.K., Taiyo Sekiyu K.K., Nippon Sekiyu K.K., Showa Sekiyu K.K., Kigunasu Sekiyu
K.K., Ky-d5 Sekiyu K.K., Maruzen Sekiyu K.K., Daikyo Sekiyu K.K., Shell Sekiyu K.K.
24
25

and Kyushu Sekiyu K.K. Together they accounted for the lion's share of the Japanese mar-

ket. Oil Price Control Cartel Case, 33 K'-t~saibansho Keiji V at 530-31, 542-43.
27 Id. at 542-57.
28 Id. at 605-06.
29

Id. at 526.

30 Id. at 611-14.
31 Id.
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fact that the court took notice of MITI's perilously close brush with activity which violated the antitrust laws is noteworthy.
C. Tsuruoka Branch of the Yamagata District Court Case (March 31,
1981)
In 1981, the Tsuruoka Branch of the Yamagata District Court had
occasion to decide a case which dealt with the same basic issues as the Oil
Cartel Cases. The Tsuruoka District Co-op (Co-op) in Yamagata Prefecture, a consumers' cooperative with 1,654 members, sued the Petroleum
Industry Federation and twelve of its members in tort for damages the
Co-op had allegedly suffered because of the over-pricing of oil in its
re32
gion during the time of the illegal oil production and price cartels.
The defendants denied civil liability in tort on the basis that the high
prices had been imposed under MITI's administrative guidance and that
factors other than cartelization were responsible for the advance in prices
in the cooperative's district.3 The District Court ruled for the defendants
because of the plaintiffs' inability to show a causal relationship between
the damages suffered and the oil cartelizations.3 1
Commenting in dicta upon the relationship between the Antimonopoly Law and administrative guidance, the District Court noted that the
Petroleum Industry Law specifically authorizes MITI to regulate the productive capacity of the oil industry, and that, pursuant to that authority,
MITI may legally issue administrative guidance to individual producers.35
Echoing the Tokyo High Court's conclusions, however, the District Court
went on to say that MITI might violate the Antimonopoly Law by distributing to important producers a table revealing its producer-by-producer allocations of oil market share (that is, by trying to win support for
MITI "administrative guidance" by publicizing the de facto cartelization
which MITI aims to create), unless a "real necessity" (hitsuyo yamuoenai
bai) for the revelation of the market share allocation scheme exists.3 6 In
other words, the District Court challenged the legitimacy of MITI-orchestrated cartels which engage the knowing participation of the cartelized
parties in their formation.
On March 16, 1981, the Japanese Fair Trade Commision (JFTC)
(MITI's long-time antagonist in struggles over free trade issues) released
a Circular concerning the relationship between the Antimonopoly Law
32 Judgment of Mar. 31, 1981, Yamagata chiho saibansho Tsuruoka shibu, Tsuruoka,
997 Hanrei jih 25-37 (1982). For a list of the twelve defendants, see supra note 26.
33 Judgment of Mar. 31, 1981, 997 Hanrei jiho at 39-60.
34 Id. at 84-90.
35 Id. at 75.

36 Id.
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and administrative guidance.37 Designed both to summarize the suggestions of the courts and to establish guidelines for the JFTC's enforcement
of the Antimonopoly Law, it merits detailed attention here.
IV.

TkHE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION CIRCULAR

In its first section, the Circular announced that administrative guidance lacking a concrete statutory basis runs a high risk of violating the
Antimonopoly Law if it tends to restrict the independence of industries in
pricing or production, particularly when it is issued to business associations.3 8 When issued to individual companies, such administrative guidance is especially hazardous if it involves the distribution of an industrywide production allotment scheme or some uniform pricing or production
standard that would cause companies to comply in the belief that all
competitors would also comply. It is also hazardous if the individual companies share with MITI or among themselves a tacit understanding or
common intent that cartelization will occur.
In its second section, the Circular declared that administrative guidance issued pursuant to express authorization in a statute does not run
afoul of the Antimonopoly Law as long as the guidance does not go beyond whatever is necessary to effect the substance of the legislative policy. 39 In short, the JFTC Circular describesan administrative guidance
"danger zone" and calls for restraint in the use of administrative guidance under all circumstances.
Although Japan's courts have not yet directly condemned administrative guidance for causing illegal cartelization, the discussion of both
MITI and the Antimonopoly Laws in the Oil Cartel Cases was a clear
warning shot. MITI may no longer view the Antimonopoly Law and the
JFTC with impunity.
V.

TRADE FRICTION AND THE OIL CARTEL CASES

From the perspective of public policy, the courts' muted calls for restraint on MITI's part were praiseworthy, albeit perhaps still too deferential to bureaucratic authority. The main issue in the cases-the relationship between antitrust law and administrative guidance-has a direct
bearing on Japan's international trade problems, and should be considered by MITI and other policymakers in that context.
The Japanese government has never admitted that it uses adminis37 FAIR TRADE COMMISSION CIRCULAR (Mar. 16, 1981), reprinted in Dokusen-Kinshih,
Kankei-H rei-ShU (Showa 57 nenban) (Antimonopoly Law and Relevant Regulations, 1982
ed.) 272-73 (K'-sei torihiki-iinkai jimukyoku, ed. 1982).
38 Id.

39 Id. at 273.
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trative guidance to hinder foreign enterprises and curtail free trade. It is,
however, a well-known fact that certain cartel arrangements, such as export, import and recession cartels, have been created under MITI's initiative or at least with MITI's assistance. 0
Even if some of the cartels thus formed are legal under Japanese law,
they appear from the perspective of foreign exporters, importers and
many affected industries to be non-tariff trade barriers, and are thus a
source of trade friction. Indeed, representatives from some foreign industries-notably from the paper, petrochemical, computer, resin, fertilizer,
and copper industries-have come to consider the frustration of foreign
entries into the Japanese market to be the raisond'etre of administrative
guidance.41 Regardless of whether such beliefs are accurate, the important
thing is that they exist. The perception that Japan cheats in the marketplace damages not only Japan's long-term credibility and standing abroad
but also the fabric of a free trade system upon which Japan so heavily
depends. If the degree of government interference in international trade
through administrative guidance were limited to a minimum, foreign distrust of Japan would be reduced. Thus, the Oil Cartel Cases must be considered as a stepping stone toward a reduction in administrative guidance
and a corresponding reduction in trade friction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
should follow the Japanese Fair Trade Commission guidelines on administrative guidance. Respect for the popular will and the rule of law should
not be trampled by MITI officials, no matter how benign their intentions
might be. Ultimately, to promote the opening of the Japanese market
place to foreign producers, MITI should retreat to a position where administrative guidance is issued only when necessary. The Japanese economy has reached maturity and a MITI nursemaid is no longer required.
That foreign entrepreneurs and governments become upset over both apparent and real protectionist elements in MITI's guidance of Japanese
companies is understandable and justifiable. MITI should reevaluate its
policies in light of the Oil Cartel Cases. If MITI is serious about reducing
trade friction, it has in its hands the means to make an immediate and
40 BEIKOKUGIKAI NO BOEKIEBUNSEKI-NIPPON,

CHUGOKU, HONKON,

ASEAN

(TRADE ANAL-

YSIS BY THE AMERICAN CONGRESS-JAPAN, CHINA, HONG KONG, ASEAN (GMBON's REPORT))
41-43 (JETRO Japanese ed. 1982); ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., NIPPON NO BOEKIKANZEISHOHEKI
NI KANSURU AMERICA-JIN NO MIKATA (THE JAPINESE NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIER ISSUE:
AimIcAN VIEws AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS) 47-48 (Sogo
kenkyu kaihatsu kiko, trans. and ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as LITTLE REPORT]; Oil Produc-

tion Control Cartel Case, 33 Kdt~saibansho Keiji V at 486.
41 LITTLE REPORT, supra note 40, at 47-48.

610
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effective contribution to that aim. MITI should immediately exercise
more self-restraint in its use of administrative guidance.

